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Abstract Cubero, de la Mata and Cubero show that women who
have attended some formal adult education are able to solve a
task in a manner that suggests that they master conceptual
thinking more than do women just starting such education. I
suggest that this interpretation is based on models of learning that
do not fully take into account the person actively engaged in
making sense of the situation. Focusing on three theoretical
issues—the language–thinking relationship, adult learning, and
the transfer of knowledge in the test situation—I propose to
reinstall an active person, and I consequently propose an
alternative interpretation of the data.
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Examining how adults solve a simple task in the frame of an adult
education setting, Cubero, de la Mata and Cubero (2008) propose an
account of the modes of thinking that people develop in a formal
educational setting. The authors admit the hypothesis that there is 
a heterogeneity of modes of thinking in people, despite genetic 
hierarchy—that is, people progressively develop different modes of
thinking as they move through different settings, and these modes
coexist in them; they do not simply replace each other. On this basis,
the authors address two issues: what changes in different ways of
thinking as adults are formally educated, and why it changes.
To address the first issue, they recall that Vygotsky distinguished
syncretic thinking, thinking in complexes, pseudoconcepts and genuine
concepts. They then point to Scribner’s (1977/1997) distinction
between functional and theoretical argumentation, and Bruner’s (1986)
distinction between narrative and propositional thinking. Cubero et al.
more or less equate functional argumentation, narrative thinking and
pseudoconcepts, on one side, and genuine concepts, theoretical argu-
mentation and propositional thinking, on the other. The question of
‘what changes’ in adult education is thus answered in terms of the
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development of a more general, context-detached, categorical mode of
speaking and thinking.
To address the second issue, that of why adults move from one mode
to the other, the authors emphasize the specificity of the settings—the
sort of activities in which people are engaged, in which different
semiotic tools are available, and which privilege the use of one or the
other mode of thinking. They analyse how women respond to two
tasks consisting in classifying images representing different types of
foodstuffs. In the first task, they have to classify them as if they were
composing a menu; in the second task, they have to classify them in a
different manner. The authors show that educated women respond to
the second task using propositional explanations and formal classifi-
cation, while women who are not formally educated give narrative
accounts, revealing an experience-based organization of elements. The
authors thus argue that, in a formal setting, educated women come to
use a formal, conceptual mode of thinking.
Although I am sympathetic with the attempt to identify coexisting
modes of thinking in people, I have the impression that the authors’
interpretation of the data is too mechanistic and does not allow us to
see the part of the active, sense-making subject behind the production
of discourse. I propose to highlight a few points in their theorization
where the ‘person’ vanishes, and I suggest that reinstalling the person
in the social situation opens the ways to alternative interpretations of
the data.
Thinking/Speaking
How to formulate the relationship between thinking and speaking is a
difficult question, and a too rigid reading of this relationship can result
in the elimination of the person.
Cubero et al. mention three theoretical distinctions made by
Vygotsky, Bruner and Scribner between different modes of thinking or
speaking. Their reading is that there is a strict correspondence between
a given mode of speaking and a specific mode of thinking; they use the
expression ‘verbal thinking’ to designate such a mode. In other words,
the authors consider that a certain mode of externalization allows the
inference that there is the corresponding thinking mode in the person.
But can we make such an inference?
Complexes, pseudo- and genuine concepts identified by Vygotsky
are supposed to designate mental organizations developed through
the person’s interactions with the world. It is the language used in
interactions which, through internalization, reorganizes the child’s
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experiences and possibilities to express him- or herself. Vygotsky
considers genuine concepts as a complex form of thinking, which
might be connected to everyday thinking and might restructure it. He
does not reduce conceptual thinking to the mastery of verbal concepts,
or the ability to classify and develop general categories to the actual
use of categorical notions in discourse. He even criticizes the naïve
pedagogical enterprise that would aim at developing conceptual
thinking trough the acquisition of verbal concepts (Vygotsky,
1934/1986, Ch. 6). In other words, although modes of thinking and
modes of expressing one’s thought are mutually dependent and
constrain each other, they cannot be reduced one to the other. Modes
of thinking develop through social interactions, not only through
language, but also through other modes of communication. Discourse
is enabled by various modes of thinking; but the use of a given
concept can as much be due to everyday concepts or to imitation than
to real mastery of conceptual reasoning.
Bruner’s idea is that we organize our representations of reality
through the mediation of tools provided by culture. He distinguishes
a logical-scientific, or propositional, organization of reality from a
narrative one. As culture often favours narrative accounts of events
and situation, people come to organize their memories and discourse
narratively, that is, according to a narrative convention. As Bruner
(1994) writes,
I shall have a great difficulty in distinguishing what may be called a
narrative mode of thought from the form of narrative discourse. As with 
all prosthetic devices, each enables and gives form to the other just as 
the structure of language and the structure of thought eventually become
inextricable. (p. 18)
These devices constitute thought, and vice versa; and methodologically
it is hard to distinguish one from the other. Yet it does not follow that
they are the same. 
Thus, on a theoretical level, modes of thinking and modes of
speaking can be said to be deeply interdependent, as Vygotsky and
Bruner propose; but it cannot be said that the latter purely reveals the
former. Also, psychologists face the epistemological difficulty of not
being able to access mind, and have to rely on externalization to infer
thinking processes; but again, this does not allow holding that one
strictly resembles the other.
Thinking that a mode of expression corresponds strictly to a mode
of thinking presupposes to admit a form of transparency of expression,
or a one-to-one correspondence between the train of thoughts and the
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train of discourse. Such ideas exclude the fact that a person is a
complex being who has more parts to his mind than the link between
thought and expression. It also excludes the fact that discourse is
always socially located and is therefore shaped by situational
demands.
First, there is always a part of personal (subjective, emotional, etc.)
experience which escapes verbal externalization. Note, for example,
that from Vygotsky’s account to Bruner’s, there is a change of scale.
Vygotsky described small units of meaning, such as concepts, or the
group of experiences caught by a pseudoconcept. Bruner’s unit of
analysis is based on wider sequences of discourse or reasoning such as
a narrative, or an explanation. Narratives and explanation might be
seen as made out of smaller units (concepts or pseudoconcepts); but
there might still be some experiences memorised as pseudoconcepts
that do not enter into a person’s complex explanations or narrations.
Actually, there are good reasons to believe that people have memories
and modes of thinking that escape verbalization. For example, psycho-
analytical studies characterize the structure of memories—semiotic
traces grouped around some emotionally relevant event—and the sorts
of logics which can enable thought to wander, through logics of re-
semblances and inclusions, from one semiotic trace to another one.
These thoughts might appear as complexes, or pseudoconcepts; yet
they cannot easily be turned into narrative or propositional discourse.
In other words, although it is clear that people do have thoughts
shaped and enabled by the properties of culturally provided semiotic
devices, this statement does not support the fact that all our thoughts
and representations are either narratively or propositionally organized. 
Second, a person’s externalization takes place in a specific setting. A
mindful person is receptive to interactive, socially situated demands;
she interprets them; she has intentions; and she might attempt to
respond to the demands of the situation in a way that she believes
satisfies, or not, these demands. Culturally speaking, the most
commonly recognized forms of discourse are narratively or prop-
ositionally organized (of course there are social settings that privilege
other modes of externalization: the meetings of the surrealists, the end
of a drinking party, or a psychoanalyst’s couch—here discourse is
expected not to be propositional or narrative!). Therefore, speaking in
a narrative form might simply suggest that a person is reacting to the
demands of a situation by using a culturally available mode of
expression which will be acknowledged. Narrative or propositional
modes of expression might thus primarily reveal a person’s attempt to
get social recognition.
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How Does a Mode of Thinking Develop?
How does one develop one or the other mode of thinking or speaking?
Cubero et al.’s proposition is that the fact of being active in a given
setting will bring people to develop the modes of speaking and thinking
promoted by that setting. Thus, adult women in an alphabetization
course will develop conceptual thinking thanks to the use and the
internalization of the semiotic tools provided by the environment; their
verbal production will be reflecting a transformation of inner thinking
processes.
Such a view hides the fact that learning is always a complex 
process, made out of actions and negotiations, hesitations and resist-
ance. Work on ontogenetic development shows the complex interactive
negotiations that take place when children find their place in their
worlds of culture. For example, research on language acquisition
shows how children progressively learn a way to understand the world
and expres themselves in a constantly negotiated manner, while also
exploring the deviations, the limits and the possibilities of the language
and cultural systems in which they enter—and so they develop their
own modes of expressions (Nelson, 2007; Pinto, Accorti Gamannossi,
& Cameron, 2006; Srivastava, Budwig, & Narashiman, 2005).
If even children—for whom mastering culture is vital—negotiate
their way into culture, it is quite obvious that adults will very carefully
negotiate every acquisition in a new sociocultural setting. Adults in
continuous education enter a new social setting with a history of past
interactions and socializations, expertises and recognitions, and so on.
These skills, abilities, belongings, are constitutive of who adults think
they are and what they feel they are capable of. Trying to make sense
of a situation, a person is mobilizing memories of similar situations,
and of her past positions in them, which might be more or less
adequate. Thus, an adult going back to formal education might first
remobilize her experiences of primary school, and, with it, some
defiance towards the instructor. Being in a new setting, adults might
notice that the set of implicit rules that structure the situation, and the
way people speak, are different from what they are used to. But why
would they change their way of speaking and presenting themselves?
It, of course, depends on what authority they confer on an adult trainer
or teacher, and on what readiness they have to change—in terms of
learning, as well as in terms of identity (e.g. Boutinet, 1995; Muller &
Perret-Clermont, 1999; West, 2006).
A theory of learning acknowledging the person would be careful to
account for the fact that adult learning is a long, fragile, hazardous,
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emotionally charged, socially negotiated process. If possible, research
on adult learning and development should document these processes
as they occur. When it is impossible, the analysis of the production 
of answers in the very setting of this school acquisition should be
interpreted with caution.
Using a Mode of Speaking
Suppose that adults entering continuous education learn what is
proposed to them. Does it mean that, questioned on diverse tasks in a
school context for an experimental task, they will actually use the
knowledge or the modes of understanding acquired in the classroom?
At school, a formal institutional setting structured by certain rules,
organized around specific social relationships, with a local and an
intergenerational history, people learn to use a specific way of speaking
and thinking (Grossen, 2000). There is no guarantee that they will use
what has been learned in a specific formal setting in any other situation
(at work, in everyday life, etc.). It has thus been shown that there is no
simple ‘transfer’ of knowledge from one sphere of experience to
another one (Beach, 2003; Säljö, 2003). Rather, in each setting, people
have to confer sense on the situation, respond to its demands, and
negotiate relationships with present others; guided by local cues, they
might mobilize past ways of thinking or doing, which can be adjusted
to satisfy the local demands—there can thus be reinvention of skills
and knowledge in a specific setting.
One way to formulate this is the following. Responding to a task is
always engaging in an activity with its motives, and sub-goals and
actions. The activity thus differs according to the sense it has for a
person, or what she tries to achieve with it, towards whom (Leontyev,
1977; Rochex, 1998). Solving an equation to have a good grade is in that
perspective a different activity than solving an equation for the fun of
it. In other words, responding to an experimental task is not ‘activat-
ing’ some transversal competence; it requires a person to interpret the
task in a certain way, and to engage in this or that sort of conduct. What
defines an activity as being ‘the same’ as another one is not an objec-
tive matter identified by the researcher; it depends on the people’s
interpretation of the situation.
But then, is there no expertise, are there no skills which subsist
beyond the situation given ? If we adopt a Vygotskian perspective, we
might suggest that some formal social settings, because of their organiz-
ation, the rules that govern them, the sort of interpersonal relationship
they promote, the reflective stance they encourage towards objects and
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towards one’s own thought, encourage the development of concepts
organized in a systematic way (e.g. Cole, 1996; Hedegaard & Chaiklin,
2005). Knowledge can then be said to progressively develop in two
directions. On the one hand, it gets distanced enough to be detached
from the actual conditions of its acquisition. Most of us can add 4 and
5 without thinking of the first time our teacher wrote the addition on
the black board. On the other hand, knowledge becomes also pro-
gressively more differentiated. It is this double movement which is
often described as progressive hierarchization (of more or less distanced
knowledge) and differentiation (Valsiner, 2000; Werner & Kaplan, 1963).
Professional expertise is, for example, often the ability to identify the
small specificities of a situation, or to see resemblances between un-
related situations, both enabling to produce a possible solution (Perret
& Perret-Clermont, 2001).
With this in mind, we can now try to interpret what happens to the
women who respond to the test situation designed by Cubero et al.
Women from two groups are asked to respond to a task in a school
setting. Some of them have just started adult education, while the
others have some experience of it. What we do not know is how much
the situation in which they are tested resembles their usual school
setting or their everyday life. On the one side, we ignore whether the
people who made them take the test were their usual teachers, and
whether the spaces in which the test took place was the actual class-
room; we neither know how much the adults who were already
schooled for some time were used to classifying sets of photographs
and cards. On the other hand, although the task is designed to ‘look
like’ an everyday task, one can question such an interpretation: in
everyday life, people usually do not do buy food on the basis of photos,
and do not play with cards to plan their dinner. In other words, my
interpretation suggests that the task is as much ‘abnormal’ for the two
groups of participants. This has as a consequence that, in both cases,
the adults would be actively trying to confer sense on the situation,
using locally available cues (it is at school, the interviewer is their
teacher or an unknown person, the photos are strange, it is like a game
but not really, we are recorded and filmed like on the radio or on
television, etc.).
On this basis, I would agree with the authors when they consider
that, in order to respond to the first task—compose a menu—the adults
draw on everyday knowledge. Yet I would suggest that it is not
because they think that it is like a daily task, and that they don’t answer
like in everyday life. It rather seems to me that they are not answering
like in everyday life, but they are playing at it, not in order to make a
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menu, but by using everyday knowledge in order to satisfy the task set
by the researcher. Consequently, I would be very careful when interpret-
ing the discourse of the women. If the activity in which they are
engaged is properly playing the game of making as-if they were
making a menu, in order to show the researcher that they can respond
to the task, then they have to use whatever resources they have to sort
out this strange situation. Also, the comments with which they
accompany the task (‘I’d serve some fruit . . . which is more filling’)
might correspond to the need of the women to justify their choices to
the researcher in this strange situation, more than to their mode of
thinking. Depending on how they interpret the situation, they would
thus use what their personal culture offers them—common-sense
explanation, TV show-like talk, or perhaps their mothers’ discourses
(e.g. Zittoun, Cornish, Gillespie, & Aveling, 2008). From this it cannot
be deduced that they think narratively when they solve an everyday
task, or when they do anything similar outside the testing situation.
In the second situation, the women are asked to classify the task
according to another criterion than the one used so far. The women with
some schooling understand that they have to answer differently than
in the first task, and they seem to be able to reinterpret the situation as
being a school-like task. It is possible that they answer to this task 
as-if they were doing something like in the classroom: for example, if
the researchers are also their teachers, the sense they confer on the
activity might be to answer ‘as they usually do with them’. However,
the difference between the schooled women and the others is that only
the former are able to use a different mode of justification, or different
sorts of resources. Their ability to change modes of justification might
thus be due to, first, an ability to distinguish nuances in the demands
of a situation; second, their mastery of different discourse modes; and,
consequently, their possibility to ‘switch mode’ if the social settings
demands it. As the authors suggest, it might be that these women can
‘privilege’ (Wertsch, 1991, p. 124) one mode of speaking—but they can
do so only if they have access to more than one speaking mode. Data
enable us to think that the more educated women are able to take some
distance towards one mode of discourse, and distinguish it from
another; but is this due to the fact that they attended a formal school
setting? It might simply designate the fact that these women become
socialized in more than one social setting. That is, the unschooled
women remain in the same mode of discourse and classification
because they master no other, not because they do not master the
school-like one. What would thus be the difference between these
women as they respond to these tests is less the fact that they are
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formally educated, than the fact that through their socialization into a
new setting, they become expert in being ‘bi-cultural’ and reflexive
about the different demands of the different spheres of activity in
which they are daily acting and interacting.
Concluding Words
Sociocultural research has proposed to see human activity as always
enabled by, and located in, a given context. Consequently, there is no
such thing as a context-free competence or skill. However, the setting
is not everything; every activity is also undertaken by a person,
actively making sense of the situation, of its whereabouts, its goals and
its resemblances with other situations met by her—these processes
being in large part not conscious.
Cubero et al., who take seriously the first of these propositions, offer
a very consistent analysis which can show the effect of schooling on
people’s expanding modes of expressing themselves. In this comment,
I have emphasized the second of these propositions, and on this basis,
I have questioned the interpretation we should give to people’s
externalization as they engage in activities of task solving. When they
do so, their answer might resemble what we expect; but their reasons
for doing so might differ from the one we infer. My suggestion is that
it might be fruitful to question what they do and why they do it—and
this especially if the results are satisfying our expectations.
At the end, this discussion might question what can be learned from
an analysis that confirms the research hypothesis. The pessimistic
answer would be that we do not learn much, because such research is
tautological: we can show that schooled adults answer formally to
questions because school teaches them to answer formally. The
optimistic answer would be that we can thus actually show how
deeply adult education can modify and develop people’s modes of
expressing themselves and understanding their environment. And the
sceptical answer—that of the researcher—would be that it is not from
these final results, but from the process, the ambiguous meanings and
the possible interpretations, that we might learn.
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